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the past and 
the construction 
of the future 
Cecilia Braslavsky* 
The situation and prospects of young people have 
changed a great deal in Argentina in recent decades 
because economic growth has been meagre, political 
problems have become more acute and social 
mobility has decreased. Against this background, the 
author examines different factors in the reality of 
youth in Argentina, such as demographic evolution, 
regional inequalities, the special conditions of young 
women, the rote of the family in the socialization of 
young people, the positive and negative effects of 
educational expansion and participation in the world 
of work. 
In these circumstances, there are considerable 
differences between adult generations and the young 
generation, particularly in the challenges they must 
face. Present-day youth finds itself in a poor country 
whose process of stagnation is very difficult to 
reverse because of the fall in the prices of traditional 
Argentine exports; the loss of traditional markets, 
which has not yet been offset by gaining new ones; 
inflationary processes that were, until quite recently, 
uncontrolled, with consequent loss of confidence in a 
productive economy; and the search of social groups 
and classes for solutions. This new poor country also 
has approximately 40% more people than it had 20 
years ago and a foreign debt of US$ 48 billion, which 
previously did not exist. Young people are the 
principal heirs of this poverty, but also one of the 
potential social actors for surmounting it. 






It is well known that Argentina is one of the 
Latin American countries whose society went 
through a process of capitalist modernization at 
an early date. It preceded other countries of the 
r eg ion in ach iev ing u r b a n i z a t i o n , 
industrialization, secularization of important 
aspects of social life, electoral participation of 
the population as a whole and access to primary 
education, as well as to other goods and services 
to meet both basic needs and needs that arose 
through modernization itself (Germani, 1965). 
It is less well known that present-day Argentine 
young people were born, raised and now live in a 
"crystallized" social scenario, that is, a society in 
which the spaces available to youth are almost 
the same as in I960. 
This crystallization of the social structure 
was basically caused by two factors. In the first 
place, a relation of dependence on the most 
industrialized countries was accentuated and, in 
the long term, had a negative impact on 
modernizing processes. In the second place, the 
political system was unable to promote 
qualitative progress towards bigger and better 
self-sustaining production, which would have 
expanded the spaces linked to such production 
and would also have redistributed its benefits 
with growing equity. Such inability of the 
political system stemmed from its power groups' 
lack of interest in achieving such goals, from 
persistent instability, from some groups' 
successive blocking of other groups' attempts to 
mobilize, and from social disturbances triggered 
by the demands of extremely numerous groups 
of the population who could find no channels to 
remodel the political system and initiate the 
changes required. From 1953 to 1983, civil and 
military governments alternated and were 
unable ever to keep together for more than three 
consecutive years a government team with 
medium and long-term strategies capable of 
generating dynamic social progress equal to that 
of preceding periods (Cavarozzi, 1983). 
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Although it may be said that the social 
structure of Argentina began to crystallize 
approximately 25 years ago, that was not the 
case with the system of relations among 
individuals and groups and particularly with 
styles of interpersonal and group relation. 
Between 1958 and 1983, ties of solidarity were 
broken, eminently competitive behaviour 
founded on individualistic bases spread and 
distrust and fear of society, and especially the 
State, developed. 
Because of the crystallization of the social 
structure, young people become integrated into 
it in a manner quite similar to that of their 
parents, or at least with far fewer differences 
from adults than in the other countries of Latin 
America. The predominant trend in Argentine 
society is for the young generation to reproduce 
trends and differences that already existed in the 
intermediate generation (25 to 30 years of age) 
1. Number and national origin 
of Argentine youth 
The youth population of Argentina is 
approximately one-sixth of the total population 
of the country (table 1), and amounted to 
4 553 104 persons in 1980: i.e., much more than 
the total population of several Latin American 
countries. Slightly more than half of these young 
people are between 15 and 19 years of age, and 
slightly fewer than half are between 20 and 24 
years of age. The former are more closely 
involved in their studies and have been greatly 
affected by the processes of the political freeze 
and social deterioration (particularly in 
education) over the past ten years. Nevertheless, 
they have greater possibilities of finding 
channels to compensate for the different losses 
of possibilities to which they were subjected. The 
latter are more autonomous, more closely 
connected to the world of work and have been 
and even many of the trends and differences that 
were evident in their parents' generation (45 to 
55 years of age). This may be noted precisely in 
the existence among present-day young people 
of groups that are at least as different or distant 
from each other as those that existed twenty 
years ago. Moving somewhat ahead in what will 
be shown in the present article, the hypothesis 
may be formulated that, in terms of their social 
involvement, these groups of young people are 
quite similar to the groups of young people who 
were to become their parents and even quite 
similar to the different groups that may be 
distinguished among their parents. Naturally, 
the tendency for patterns of social involvement 
that already existed —and still persist— in adult 
generations to be reproduced in the young 
generation does not imply unchangeability or 
paralysis of social dynamics. 
more affected by medium-term demographic 
processes and short-term economic processes. In 
Argentina, the youth population is on the 
increase, although with ups and downs and much 
more slowly than in the other countries of the 
region, while the population of elderly persons is 
increasing more rapidly. This demographic 
structure, together with some characteristics of 
the occupational, wage and social benefit 
structure of the country, indicates that the young 
people of today must not only be able to meet 
their own needs but must also be responsible for 
meeting a growing proportion of the needs of an 
increasing group of non-economically active 
adults. This can probably only be accomplished 
through a process of national capitalization, 
scientific development and consequent 
independent technological modernization, 
reactivation of production, administrative 
rationalization and changes in the social 
structure. 
II 
Number and distribution of youth in Argentina 
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Table 1 
ARGENTINA: PERCENTAGES OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE TOTAL 
POPULATION, BY SEX AND AGE, I960, 1970 AND 1980 
1960 1970 1980 
Age Groups 
Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females 
15 to 24 16.1 15.09 16.3 17.1 16.6 17.6 16.3 16.5 16.1 
15 to 19° 8.4 8.3 8.5 9.0 9.1 8.8 8.4 8.5 8.2 
20 to 24° 7.6 7.5 7.7 8.2 7.5 8.8 7.9 8.0 7.9 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Censo nacional de población, 1960; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Censos (INDEC), Censo nacional de población, familias y vivienda, 1970 and Censo nacional de población y 
vivienda, 1980. 
"The 1970 results were obtained through sampling. 
A potential advantage that the young 
population has over previous generations in 
confronting this situation is that it is more 
homogeneous in origin. In contrast to the 
situation at the end of the last century and the 
beginning of the present one, the vast majority 
of yourig people residing in Argentina are now 
second, third or fourth generation Argentines. 
Only 177 921 young people were foreigners in 
1980 and, although from that date to the present 
time numerous Uruguayans, Chileans, 
Paraguayans, Koreans and young people of 
other origins have come to live in the country, 
the youth profile cannot have changed 
substantially in regard to national origin. 
2. Regional inequalities and youth 
One of the main objectives of Argentine society 
and State at the end of the past century was to 
make a population of extremely diverse national 
origins more homogenous. This objective has 
now been achieved. It ¡s curious, however, that 
the young generation has not been able to take 
advantage of this achievement in order also to 
make its possibilities for social participation 
more homogeneous. The structure of regional 
differences tends to be as crystallized as that of 
social differences, so that it prevents young 
people from certain regions of the country from 
having possibilities for proper participation in 
national reactivation and, what is more, from 
sharing in the benefits of such reactivation on 
even a halfway equitable basis. 
The traditionally unequal and unintegrated 
development of the different regions of the 
country —made worse by the enormous 
distances, which have not been shortened 
sufficiently by agricultural settlements or proper 
road and rail infrastructure suitable for 
interregional communication— counteract the 
advantages of shared nationality and represent 
obstacles to shared identity. 
The young people of the North-West 
(Catamarca, La Rioja, Tucumán, Salta, Jujuy and 
Santiago del Estero) share the problems of 
Andean peoples, such as the avidity of the 
climate and the land and great distances between 
towns in an isolated mountain atmosphere. 
Young people of the North-East, particularly 
those in the regions that border on Brazil, 
confront situations characteristic of areas 
sharing a border with a country that is 
developing more rapidly, producing more 
cheaply and penetrating culturally. Young 
people who live in many cities in Patagonia 
participate in modernizing trends that the other 
young people are completely unaware of. Those 
in Córdoba, Greater Buenos Aires and the 
Central Cordillera or Cuyana Area are the most 
affected by economic decay: the former by 
disindustrialization, the latter by the destructive 
processes affecting the regional economies. The 
young people of Córdoba and Buenos Aires may 
be distinguished, however, by their possibilities 
44 CEPAL REVIEW No. 29 / Augutt ¡986 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF THE SITUATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE, 
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27 947 446 
9 766 030 
2 922 829 
6 843 201 
8 012 080 
4 022 207 
2 465 546 
908 313 
2 407 754 
208 260 
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Censo nacional de población y vivienda, 1980. 
"Without education or with incomplete primary schooling. 
Percentage of the young population incorporated into the EAP, with or without a job. 
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of receiving a heritage of greater participation 
and also opposition to participation: a fact which 
could provide useful lessons for overcoming the 
effects of decay. 
Within the framework of the enormous 
regional differences, two facts affect youth in 
particular. The first is that although, in the 
country as a whole, only two out of every ten 
young people live in rural areas, in more than 
one-third of the 23 Argentine provinces (and 
particularly in all the provinces of the North-
East) between one-third and half of the young 
people continue to be rural. The poorest 
provinces tend to have more rural youth, whose 
possibilities of education and work are, in fact, 
inferior and who must make greater integration 
efforts if they decide to participate in the search 
for other horizons (table 2). 
This search for new horizons naturally takes 
place in different forms, according to the 
province of origin and the ¡mage that young 
people form concerning what is occurring in 
regions other than their own. It continues to be 
directed principally towards the Federal Capital, 
As well as the regional differences already 
indicated, there are pronounced differences in 
the social participation of the two sexes in 
Argentina. Sex-linked differentiation, however, 
lies above regional differences, since it is 
reproduced even in the regions that may be 
considered the most advanced. 
The most important difference between 
young women and young men in Argentina is 
that 762 690 young women remain in a situation 
where they are exclusively in the home 
(Braslavsky, 1985b and 1985c), which means 
that the only social participation of all those 
women is within the family, where they are 
involved, to different degrees, in attending the 
other members of the family. 
Greater Buenos Aires and the large city of 
Córdoba, which all had positive youth migration 
figures between 1975 and 1980. Such migration 
is, however, probably prompted by an outdated 
image of the possibilities of social absorption 
offered by these cities. The latest thing in youth 
migration is the orientation towards Patagonia, 
consisting of the five southermost provinces of 
the country (Rio Negro, Chubut, Neuquén, 
Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego), which have 
rich mineral and tourism resources and greater 
political stability than the rest of Argentina, 
based in some cases on the leadership of 
provincial caudillos committed to local 
modernization projects. Patagonia was and is 
the target of national policies for regional 
promotion (exemption from taxes for new 
industries, increased zone allowances for civil 
servants, and so forth) which have made it a true 
pole of attraction for the population, although it 
has not yet surmounted its previous 
backwardness nor surpassed the greater 
attraction of some other regions of the country. 
In 1980, more than three of every ten 
women from 15 to 24 years of age neither 
studied nor worked. Among them, a great many 
young women had no family obligations to 
occupy them in the home during the day, since 
they were neither married nor mothers. It is 
difficult to assume that all of them took care of 
younger brothers or sisters or of their parents. It 
is more likely that they were simply waiting to 
get married, as their only prospect of personal 
fulfilment. 
Conservative concepts regarding the social 
place of women, transmitted through formal 
education (particularly through the family 
stereotypes disseminated in school books 
(Wainerman and Berck, 1984; Wainerman, 
HI 
The situation of young Argentine women 
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1983)) and through the values sustained by the 
most influential groups within the hierarchy of 
the Catholic Church, are some of the ideological 
factors that inhibit the creative participation of 
young women in appropriate strategies to 
confront the challenges facing their generation. 
The percentage of such young women is very 
high for a country like Argentina. In addition to 
these ideological factors, there are certainly also 
structural difficulties in offering young women 
educational or work options, especially in the 
poorest provinces. 
Both ideological and structural factors are 
frequently linked to the perpetuation of life 
styles typical of the concentration of power in 
strong local conservative oligarchies that 
sometimes revolve around influential provincial 
political parties. In other cases, such oligarchies 
are organized around sectors of the most 
important political parties in Argentina, which 
sometimes also maintain firm ties with local 
ecclesiastical hierarchies. Under such 
circumstances, religious instruction is still given 
in public schools, which have been under the 
administration of the provincial governments 
since 1978, while the content of curricula in non-
religious subjects has not yet been secularized. 
These practices facilitate the penetration of 
concepts and values that indicate the home as the 
The present-day youth of Argentina were born 
between 1955 and 1965. They grew up and 
became socialized in homes subject to intense 
changes, including notably: a) the shift of entire 
families or some of their members from rural to 
urban areas; b) the growing incorporation of 
women into the world of work; and c) the effects 
of increasing violence, particularly that of the 
State, and the consequent withdrawal of families 
into themselves as a result of daily life becoming 
more private. 
only suitable place for female participation, 
apart from religious and educational 
institutions. 
The chains of factors and the dynamics of 
politics that exist in some Argentine provinces 
make the percentage of young women who state 
that they dedicate themselves to housework one 
of the most valid, though least used, indicators of 
the differences among provinces. While only 
6,1 % of the girls from 14 to 19 years of age and 
14.3% of those from 20 to 24 years of age in the 
Federal Capital stated that their occupation was 
housework, the respective percentages reached 
35.2% and 60.1% in EI Chaco, which is a 
province with high percentages of rural and 
Indian population, negative youth migration 
figures, frankly makeshift industrial 
development and the worst levels of schooling 
and education of the adult population in 
Argentina (table 2). 
Undoubtedly, other factors also contribute to 
the transmission and acceptance of traditional 
values in the socialization of young Argentine 
women. One of them is the withdrawal of the 
population into private spheres, such as the 
family and religious groups, during periods in 
which public spheres have become aggressive 
and dangerous. 
Although, separately, all of these changes 
are common to one or another country of Latin 
America, their combination in Argentina 
resulted in some changes being contradicted by 
others, which produced a distinct and quite 
unique situation. Shifts from the countryside to 
the city and the growing participation of 
mothers in public life, either through work or in 
other forms (political parties, development 
associations, foundations, and so forth), may 
have helped to widen the gap between 
IV 
Family and youth 
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generations, owing basically to the reduction in 
the time available to the adult generations for 
organizing joint activities, the decrease in shared 
social spaces and the participation of each 
generation in quite different spheres of 
socialization. In fact, in the parents' generation 
the weight of patterns of rural life was, for many, 
much more important than that of urban life 
patterns, whereas the socialization of young 
people took place mainly in accordance with 
urban patterns, even in the case of rural youth. 
Expansion of schooling, conceived in accordance 
with the characteristics of urban life, and of the 
mass media, where the countryside has almost 
no representation, contributed to urban 
socialization, which in many cases had its effect 
in advance: it facilitated the incorporation of 
nearly half a million young migrants into the 
cities at lower emotional and social costs (Cunha, 
1986). The capacity of Argentine families to 
socialize the young generations was not reduced, 
however, and in recent years there have been no 
generational conflicts with broad social impact. 
The absence of serious generational conflicts 
and the conservation and even reinforcement of 
the family's capacity to socialize young people is 
basically the result of daily life becoming more 
private between 1976 and 1983. This increased 
privacy was a social response to the increase in 
violence in public spheres and, particularly, to 
the increase in violence on the part of the State. 
Violence was a constant in Argentine society 
from the end of the 1960s up to the early 1980s. 
It cannot be said to have eventually disappeared 
during this period: rather, the ways in which it 
was manifested changed. During the first stages, 
violence formed part of a social rebellion, or had 
the nature of a radical revolutionary youth 
manifestation with messianic components. 
Many justified different types of aggression on 
the basis of deep questioning of the dependent 
capitalistic nature of Argentine society, without 
however proposing clear alternatives shared by 
all those involved in such questioning. 
Gradually, this youth violence, with its 
revolutionary and messianic components, was 
defeated by the reactionary violence of para-
State groups and the State itself, which further 
embroiled the general state of affairs by 
beginning the war of the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas). Undoubtedly, each of the different 
manifestations of violence that have upset 
society over the past 20 years has been different 
and should be analysed with different 
parameters. Nevertheless, all have at least two 
common traits that have direct consequences on 
families, young people and the relations between 
young people and their families. The first is that 
young people were the great leaders and the 
second is that, among families, violence helped 
to produce a climate of fear concerning the 
paticipation of young people in public life and 
growing apathy among young people 
themselves. The manifestations of youth 
violence that persist are of an individual nature 
or involve small groups and are associated 
precisely with such apathy. State violence also 
helped to reinforce young people's lack of 
confidence in State institutions as valid 
interlocutors. These processes lay at the roots of 
the greater privacy in daily life and the relative 
strengthening of family ties in comparison to 
other social ties. 
The increase in the privacy of daily life was 
stronger than other processes that could have 
made young people more distant from their 
parents and could have caused the family to lose 
ground as a socializing agent. The family 
consequently played a leading role in the 
socialization of present-day young Argentines. It 
helped to save democratic social awareness and 
the cultural heritage from the advance of 
authoritarianism and obscurantism in public 
spheres, to orient some (extremely protected) 
forms of socialization outside the family in clubs 
and community and religious organizations, and 
to compensate in some way for the lack of social 
concern about the future job placement of young 
people. Although these processes of conserving 
democracy took place at the expense of also 
preserving certain prejudices and taboos, their 
main effect was that the few young people who 
were able to avoid the growing decadence of the 
educational system, to gain access to relatively 
privileged jobs in a context of growing 
unemployment and a breakdown in the labour 
hierarchy, and to assume leading political roles 
in the democratic transition process that began 
in 1963, did so thanks to their comparative 
family advantages, which allowed them to 
confront various situations in better conditions 
than other members of their generation. 
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V 
Educational levels of young people 
Present-day youth directly received both the 
benefits and the negative effects of the 
expansion of the educational system, which 
speeded up as from 1950, with priority given to 
primary education up to I960, to pre-school and 
secondary education in the following decade and 
to higher or university education since 1970. 
During the last years of the military 
government, youth was also affected by the 
limitations imposed on some levels and key 
areas of the system, particularly the elimination 
of adult primary education, less expansion at the 
middle level, the closing of industrial colleges, 
and the policies of limiting university activities 
(Tedesco, et al., 1984). 
The expansion of the formal educational 
system was not accompanied by an equivalent 
improvement in performance. School drop-out 
rates at the primary and middle levels of the 
formal educational system continued to be very 
high, particularly in poor provinces and in rural 
areas. Thus, the school drop-out rate for the 
cohort of young people born in 1955 was 51.2%, 
rising to more than 70% in most of the 
provinces of the North-East and North-West, as 
well as in some of the provinces of Patagonia. 
Nine years later —that is, for the younger 
segment of today's youth— the drop-out rate 
had decreased, but the national average was still 
47.8% and it reached more than 60% in all rural 
areas, except in some provinces of the Pampa 
region. 
Throughout the time that this cohort was 
passing through the educational system, the 
quality of education deteriorated continuously. 
As early as 1972, primary school curricula, 
particularly in the Province of Buenos Aires, 
began to be restricted to the teaching of reading 
and writing in the first grades. This situation 
became critical some years later, when teaching 
more than 13 letters of the alphabet in the first 
grade was prohibited (Municipalidad de Buenos 
Aires, 1984). The results of this and other 
curriculum decisions became evident in the 
performance of 74 114 primary school leavers in 
the entrance examinations for secondary schools 
throughout the country in December 1981 
(these adolescents are now 17 years of age). On 
average, these results showed that they only had 
60% of the language requirements and 29% of 
the required knowledge of mathematics. The 
tests were based on the curricula of fourth and 
fifth grades and not on those of seventh grade 
(La Nación, 1982). At the secondary level, the 
deterioration was even worse. The programmes 
in operation and the most commonly used 
textbooks were prepared in the 1960s. 
Computing, informatics, social history, 
economics and nuclear physics, for example, 
were only taught in the "best" public and private 
schools; some of these subjects were not even 
taught in universities either. 
Young people who remained within the 
educational system for the same number of years 
were not necessarily equally affected by the 
decline in its quality. Because of the 
establishment of educational circuits or 
segments with different conditions for learning 
through different educational models, there 
were young people who formally reached levels 
of higher education, although this did not 
increase their possibilities of access to abstract 
thinking or to modern and advanced fields of 
knowledge. 
A fact that is clear to researchers, but is 
disguised by everyday appearances, is that the 
segments that offer the best conditions for 
learning and that promote an educational model 
in which the acquisition of scientific knowledge 
and the practice of abstract thinking occupy a 
central position select their students in 
accordance with the latter's socio-occupational 
and educational origin. Through complex 
mechanisms that have been studied in detail in 
recent investigations, however, an apparent 
system of merit has been constructed in the 
education system which makes all those who go 
through the system believe that their progress 
depends on personal qualities, particularly 
intelligence and dedication (Braslavsky, 1985a; 
Filmus, 1986). 
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Deterioration in the quality of teaching 
through backwardness or stagnation in the 
content selected, when compared to the advance 
in overall knowledge elsewhere, finds its 
expression in the authoritarian ritual of school 
Ufe. School work became acting "as if" the 
children were learning, whereas actually they 
were only fulfilling a set of standard rites 
(Vecino, et ai, 1979). Authority was used to 
impose authoritarianism, the only way to 
maintain order among big groups of adolescents 
and young people in institutions which they 
were attending, for the most part, only to obtain 
a required credential, with no interest in the 
content being offered (Coleman, 1968). 
Many of the processes described are now 
being modified. The expansion of some levels 
and key areas of the educational system has been 
revitalized; primary school curricula have been 
revised in several places in the country, and 
authoritarian practices in secondary schools and 
universities are changing. Argentine youth, 
however, has a profile and educational level that 
basically corresponds to what education was 
during the ten years prior to 1983. 
The results of the educational model applied 
prior to 1983 are of two types: those of an 
objective nature and those that are linked to the 
creation of social awareness. 
The most important five objective results 
are: an increase in the level of formal education 
of the young generation in comparison to 
previous generations (table 3); standardization 
of formal educational levels for both young men 
and young women and, in recent years, an 
upward trend in the level of women's education; 
a lack of correspondence between the average 
number of years spent in the educational system 
and the quantity and quality of knowledge 
acquired; inequality of education of young people 
of different jurisdictions, geographic areas and 
social groups, even when their level of formal 
education is identical; and the persistence of 
insufficient education in significant groups of 
young people. 
As regards the creation of social awareness, 
it may be said that young people who could not 
finish primary school, did not reach the 
secondary level or could not manage to enrol in 
the university are, for the most part, convinced 
that they have failed because they really are less 
capable. The selection of young people for access 
to succesive levels within the formal educational 
system, as well as for remaining in each of these 
levels or for attending better or inferior 
establishments has functioned in such a way that 
it has played a strong legitimizing role: it has 
helped to produce attitudes of self-sufficiency or 
of mere conformism in many young people, 
depending on whether their passing through the 
educational system provided them with greater 
or fewer benefits than those of their peers. 
Differential formation of self-esteem began in 
this manner in primary school and continued 
throughout the entire educational system, which 
seemed to put those who were successful on one 
side and those who were not, on the other. In 
actual practice, it left only young people from 
low-income sectors on the side of the 
unsuccessful, although it allowed for the 
incorporation of a few of them into the other 
group. 
The relation between the regional, social and 
educational situation of the population and the 
use of school opportunities was concealed from 
most young people by concentrating on school 
performance. On the basis of this distorted view 
of the educational possibilities offered by the 
society, many young people likewise justify the 
differences in their job opportunities. 
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Table 3 
ARGENTINA: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL BY SEX AND AGE GROUP, ACCORDING 
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Source: a) Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Censo nacionalde población, i960. Volume I, Total del país, tables 
1Û, B and 14. fe.) 1'970: JiNDEC, Censa nacional de población, familias y vivienda, 1970. Results obtained by 
sampling, tabled, c) JNDEC, Cenm nacional de población y vivienda, 1980. Volume I. Total del país, tables 4,7 and 8. 
Taken from Braslavsky, C. -and C Bersotti, Proceso histérico de la superación de ias desigualdades educativas de los 
jóvenes y mujeres enïa Argentina, paper presented at the Regional Technical Meetingon Overcoming Educational 
Inequalities of Young People and Women in Latin America and the Caribbean, Panama, July 19.83. 
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VI 
Work and young people 
In 1869, when the First National Population 
Census was held, 89.8% of the males between 15 
and 19 years of age and 95.3% of those between 
20 and 24 years of age participated in economic 
activities, while 64.2% and 65.9%, respectively 
of females were economically active (Recchini de 
Lattes and Lattes, 1975). Thus, the most 
widespread activity among young people of both 
sexes and both age groups was paid work outside 
of the home. As a result of expansion of the 
formal e d u c a t i o n a l sys tem and of 
transformation of the agro-export economy into 
an economy with an incipient and later 
heterogeneous industrial sector (which required 
a smaller labour force, but partly of a higher 
educational level), as well as changes in the social 
images of what were desirable activities for 
young people of each sex and each age group, 
there was a progressive redistribution of young 
people between economic activities (or work), 
study and staying at home. This redistribution 
should not be overestimated, however. 
Most young people work. The proportions 
of men and women who do so are different, since 
many young women (although fewer than in 
past generations) tend to stay at home taking 
care of the house. 
The most characteristic traits of the work of 
young people are as follows: the majority of 
young people, just like adults, are in a relation of 
dependence on a private employer or the State; 
they have also been affected by the tertiarization 
processes of the economy and expansion of own-
account work; they are over-represented in jobs 
with fewer possibilities for personal fulfilment, 
union affiliation and wage prospects, and, within 
industrial jobs, they are not concentrated in any 
particular sector, but rather reproduce the 
distribution pattern of generations that came 
before them. 
In 1980,74% of the young people from 15 to 
24 years of age worked in a dependent 
relationship, compared with a figure of 66% for 
the entire economically active population. The 
difference occurs because of the incidence of 
domestic employment, which constitutes 12% 
of the employment of young people between 15 
and 24 years of age and more than 30% of young 
women's jobs in this age group. The proportion 
of younger youth in a relationship of dependence 
was 71.5% and that of older youth, 76.3%. Data 
from permanent household surveys of 31 urban 
conglomerates show that 67.4% of the young 
people who worked were wage-earners in 1984. 
In 1984, 11 % of the young people in the 31 
cities included in the surveys worked on their 
own account or worked without pay in some 
dependent relationship (probably a family 
relationship). Many young people did not 
answer those taking the survey precisely, which 
implies that their situation was uncertain. Most 
of the young people who worked on their own 
account or without wages and did not know how 
to define their work situation precisely, as well as 
many of those who did receive wages, were in 
occupation groups that could be considered 
critical, as had already occurred in 1980. 
The earlier young people are incorporated 
into the labour force, the greater the possibility 
of their joining occupational groups with no 
future. Owing particularly to the low educational 
level with which they begin to work, their jobs 
are limited to working as domestic staff, 
labourers, apprentices, factory hands, juniors or 
other unskilled activities. In 1980, young people 
occupied in these activities accounted for almost 
24% of the economically active youth 
population, although the total number of 
workers in these activities accounted for only 
8% of the total economically active population. 
Of the young people in these jobs, 50% had no 
formal education or had not completed primary 
school. 
In spite of the progress in trends towards 
tertiarization of the economy and the large 
number of young people performing unskilled 
jobs, the most numerous youth occupation group 
is that of skilled industrial workers, accounting 
for more than half a million young people of 
both sexes. The distribution of young people 
among the different industrial sectors is almost 
the same as that of adults. For example, 22.5 % of 
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young skilled workers were employed in the 
metalworking industry in 1980, as against 
21.5% of total workers. In the textile industry, 
the respective percentages were 4.2% and 3.2%. 
A comparison of the distribution of skilled 
workers in the different industrial sectors by age 
groups shows that there is no relation between 
differences in industrial employment and 
generational differences. This reflects at least 
three processes: a) industries hire workers 
according to criteria other than age; 
b) generations of workers are renewed within 
each sector; and c) the trend towards greater 
social mobility of the members of some sectors, 
for example the metalworking sector, is not 
necessarily linked to the presence of greater 
numbers of young people. Crystallization of the 
social structure, which was already mentioned, is 
also clearly evident, and socialization processes 
related to such crystallization may be inferred, 
particularly the existence of differentiated 
labour socialization mechanisms: parents in 
each industrial sector seem to overcome 
difficulties their children might encounter 
entering the industrial sector by transmitting 
work techniques and information concerning 
matters such as the operational, hiring and 
promotion mechanisms within the labour 
market sector to which they belong. 
In the introduction it was stated that Argentine 
youth now finds itself in a poor country. Its 
poverty is both material and political (Demo, 
1985). Not only are resources insufficient to 
meet material needs, but political practices and 
concepts have also remained partially 
crystallized. Only after 1982, following the crisis 
of the Falklands (Malvinas) war, did some 
political parties, intermediate organizations and 
social groups begin to rethink what Argentina 
was. In this regard, the Partido Radical (Radical 
Party) appeared to young people to be the bearer 
In addition to the general trends pointed out, 
the student worker or worker student category is 
growing among young people; unemployment is 
increasing and wages are deteriorating. Already 
in 1981, 65% of the students of the National 
University of Buenos Aires were working, and in 
1982, 68% of the students of the National 
Technological University had jobs. The situation 
seems to be the same in the other tertiary and 
higher-level institutions. In 1984, youth 
unemployment in 31 urban conglomerates 
reached the record figure of almost 11% of the 
economically active population in this age group. 
Between March 1980 and March 1984, the 
proportion of young people within the group 
receiving the lowest wages increased 
considerably. In the Federal Capital in March 
1980, 2.5% of the young workers earned up to 
60% of the minimum wage and 8%, more than 
four times the minimum wage, but in 1984, 
14.5% earned up to 67% of the minimum wage 
and only 1.7% perceived more than four 
minimum wages. This trend occurred in many 
other cities as well (INDEC, 1985). 
The labour situation of young people is only 
a reflection of the labour situation of the 
population as a whole; it is no better and no 
worse and it is just one of the dimensions of the 
poverty now afflicting Argentina. 
of an attractive response which was oriented 
towards non-violent social dynamics to settle 
social conflicts, towards support for the 
strengthening of ties of solidarity and the 
modernization of the economy, as well as 
towards changes in certain policies that affected 
young people in particular. In this last sense, it 
included the elimination of obligatory military 
service and of university entrance examinations 
in its 1982 pre-election platform. 
After the Radical Party came to power, 
measures coherent with some of its proposals 
VII 
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were taken. In the case of those specifically 
directed towards youth, obligatory military 
service was reduced in several ways (although 
not eliminated) and free access to universities 
and to the degree programmes that each young 
person wished to study was granted. At the same 
time, the State promoted a proposal of 
"modernization", whose content has not yet 
been fully defined. In principle, it seems to 
consist of creating favourable conditions for 
productive investment, promoting exports and 
supporting reforms that will contribute to 
increased productivity in certain branches of 
industry, as well as for rationalizing the tertiary 
sector and particulary public employment. 
Briefly summarizing the government proposal, 
it may be said that it will attempt to surmount 
material poverty through production 
modernization and political poverty through 
non-violent participation in institutions that 
have been persecuted for many years, especially 
the youth groups of political parties and student 
centres. It will also indirectly favour the 
participation of young people in the organized 
labour movement, through the unions. 
There is a risk that the form taken by 
modernization will not contribute sufficiently to 
the generation of conditions favouring a type of 
national development that is less dependent on 
large economic units and corporations. In this 
regard, it seems particularly necessary to 
produce a firm scientific and technological 
structure that can serve as a half-way point 
between the advanced technology of the highly 
industrialized countries and that of Argentina, 
and to go more deeply into the search for 
independent avenues of scientific and 
technological development. Likewise, it also 
seems necessary to increase all the measures to 
keep capital in the country. 
The participation proposal has undoubtedly 
been accepted by a significant proportion of 
young people. During the years immediately 
prior to 1983, the most widespread form of 
youth participation was through music. By 
attending festivals of "Argentine rock" held in 
enclosed areas, songs prohibited on mass media 
could be heard; increasingly, themes of protest 
were accompanied, and sometimes replaced, by 
themes of love for life, solidarity, hope and peace 
(Vila, 1985). Since 1982, many young people 
have begun to participate in the political parties. 
Today, their presence is significant in the two 
large traditional parties, the Partido Radical and 
the Partido Justicialista, in other minor parties 
and also in two new parties which seem to 
suggest that the present particularly attractive 
options for growing groups of young people 
because of their clear and homogeneous 
ideological lines: the Unión de Centro 
Democrática, where there is a strong influence 
from the "new right", and the Partido 
Intransigente, which appears as an option for 
the anti-imperialist left, although it is more 
closely linked to previously existing styles and 
concepts. 
In the context of the deep segmentation 
affecting Argentine youth, the trends referred to 
above could lead to sectoral modernization 
which would only benefit youth groups of 
specific industrial and services sectors. The 
process of direct entrance into the universities 
also presents some problems: it was introduced 
without the parallel creation of job sources with 
sufficient wages and on-the-job training 
possibilities, which would have provided an 
alternative to young people, in a situation where 
working conditions (and particularly wages) of 
university researchers and teachers were 
deteriorating: a teacher in charge of a course, for 
example, receives beween US$ 60 and US$ 250 a 
month. These circumstances make it impossible 
to be optimistic about the processes of restoring 
scientific and technological capacity. The 
persistence of a strong outflow of capital also 
precludes any expectation of significant capital 
accumulation in Argentina. 
Youth can become an important actor in 
tackling future tasks, in participating in social 
dynamics and in helping to prevent a type of 
modernization that would involve the risks 
pointed out above. For this purpose, young 
people need to change and to overcome some of 
the legacies of the past (Rama and Faletto, 
1985). In principle, these legacies are: the 
weakness of young people's common identity; 
their lack of confidence in public spheres, 
whether social or political, which is reflected in 
the participaton of very few young people in 
student centres, political parties, development 
associations, union commissions, and so forth; 
the small amount of knowledge acquired and its 
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obsolescence; the predominance in some groups 
of practices that foster competition for 
individual advancement or confrontation in thé 
political struggle, rather than espousing 
solidarity and co-operation; the penetration of 
harmful and conservative concepts in some 
groups, particularly among young women; and 
the lack of the training needed to solve some 
problems independently, together with a certain 
tendency to make excessive demands on those 
whose roles complement their own (teachers, 
for example). Young people have a significant 
background attesting to their capacity for 
change, such as, for example, the activities of the 
Political Youth Movement (Movimiento de 
Juventudes Políticas), which has striven, ever 
since it was formed, to surmount political 
practices of mutual opposition and to produce 
constructive and consensual forms of settling 
conflicts; volunteer participation in activities 
such as adult literacy programmes and assistance 
in running free clinics, at different times in the 
country's history; solidary actions undertaken 
within the framework of "Priority: Youth" 
(Prioridad, Juventud) in the church; values 
spread by some currents of the "Argentine rock" 
movement; the organization of parallel 
academic activities when those existing were 
considered deficient; and clear preference for 
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academic quality on the part of young people 
who have participated in selecting personnel to 
fill university teaching posts, when statutes call 
for their participation. 
Finally, it should be added that this process 
cannot replace special government policies for 
youth aimed at solving precisely those problems 
that young people, and particularly those with 
limited material and educational resources, 
cannot solve for themselves. Before formulating 
any other type of policy aimed at youth, 
government agencies should consequently give 
priority to addressing the problem of growing 
unemployment among young people (which is 
of course not unrelated to the rising 
unemployment of adults) in conjunction with 
private enterprise, whose companies employ the 
highest percentage of young workers. 
The problem of unemployment, and 
particularly of youth unemployment, is new in 
Argentina. It may be only a passing phase, or it 
may become chronic. In the latter case, 
Argentina will have divided its youth even more 
deeply and the dividing line will be between the 
generation of modernization, on the one hand, 
and the generation of the unemployed, on the 
other. The impact that such a situation would 
have on democratic stability is unpredictable. 
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